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Is it All or Nothing?: Samsung 
Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc. 
VICTORIA E. THORNTON*© 
 
 In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,1 the 
Supreme Court was tasked to find whether 35 U.S.C. § 289 
of the Patent Act, covering remedies for infringement of a 
design patent, incorporated both the distinct parts of a 
protected device and also the complete, shelf-to-consumer 
product ready for sale.2 In a short opinion, the Court held 
that section 289 does in fact contemplate that fragments can 
be the relevant “article of manufacture” for purposes of 
damage allocation and therefore, the patent holder will not 
in every circumstance be awarded a disgorgement of the total 
profits the infringer has received as a result of selling the 
complete device.3 The Court then remanded the case back to 
the Federal Circuit to decide what the relevant “article of 
manufacture” was for purposes of damage calculation.4 
The Court reached the correct decision in this case 
because it chose to focus on the specific meaning of the words 
in section 289, without unduly manipulating or 
overcomplicating the analysis. Moreover, the decision to 
broadly construe the Patent Act was firmly rooted in 
precedent; the Court wisely considered its prior rulings on 
design infringement and reiterated that these decisions 
formed the basis of section 289. However, despite the Court’s 
direction being correct, ultimately, the decision left a lot to be 
desired. The opinion neglected to provide a test concerning 
 
* J.D. 2019, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
© Victoria Thornton 2019. 
1 Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
2 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 429. 
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how exactly future courts are supposed to determine the 
relevant “article of manufacture,” engendering legal 
uncertainty in a field that already struggles to keep pace with 
burgeoning technological development. 
 
I. THE CASE 
 
In 2011, Apple Inc. successfully sued Samsung Electronics 
Co., Ltd. for infringing several patents, specifically those 
related to the appearance of the iPhone device.5 Design 
patents D593,087, covering the raised rim of the device, 
round corners and the rectangular front; D618,677 covering 
its black, rectangular front face and rounded corners; and 
D604,305 covering 16 chromatic icons arranged in a grid 
were all found to have been infringed.6 The jury awarded 
Apple millions in damages for the infringement, which 
represented the total profits Samsung had made from the 
sale of these devices.7 Samsung subsequently appealed to 
contest the amount of the award, stating that Apple should 
not be entitled to its total profits from the sale of the 
products.8 The Federal Circuit rejected this apportionment 
view, subscribing to a perspective that “[t]he innards of 
[petitioner’s] smartphones were not sold separately from 
their shells as distinct articles of manufacture to ordinary 
purchasers,” thus, concluding that Apple should be entitled 
to Samsung’s entire profits.9 
 Therefore, the dispute before the Supreme Court 
derived from a textual interpretation issue concerning the 
language in section 289 of the Patent Act. The Act specifies 
that patent holders shall be protected from design 
 
5 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 
rev'd and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
6 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 434. 
9 Apple Inc., 786 D.3d 983 at 1002.  
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infringement over “any article of manufacture for the 
purposes of sale.”10 The Act furthermore, continues that the 
owner of the design shall be entitled to “the extent of his [the 
infringer’s] total profit.”11 At trial, Samsung argued that in 
order to properly calculate damages, the focus should be 
limited to the precise “article” that the design in question was 
applied to, not the entire device.12 However, Apple had once 
again argued that because a product like a smartphone 
cannot be severed and sold separately by its parts alone, the 
relevant “article” must be the entire device.13 
Without getting overly technical with its analysis, the 
Court relied heavily on the dictionary to clarify the statutory 
language.14 In addition, the Court posited that the history 
behind section 289 was predominately based off its prior 
rulings that preferred severability, or the “apportionment 
method” to allocate damages.15 In light of this perspective, 
the Federal Circuit’s reading of the Act was considered to be 
uncompromisingly narrow and inflexible.16 The Court found 
that when it comes to the involvement of design patents 
covering multicomponent products, the statutory language 
“article of manufacture” is applicable both to fragmentary 
parts of the device, as well as the body of the completed 
product ready to hand over to consumers.17 The Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded this case for further 
proceedings,18 and after seven years of going back and forth 
 
10 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012). 
11 Id.  
12 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 434. 
15 See Id. (“The text resolves this case. The term ‘article of manufacture,’ 
as used in § 289, encompasses both a product sold to a consumer and a 
component of that product.”). 
16 Id. 
17 See supra note 15. 
18 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 431. 
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in the courts, the parties have finally settled over the matter 
for an undisclosed value.19 
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND  
 
Interpretations of section 289 of the Patent Act have 
oscillated since its original codification. Where some courts 
interpreted the statutory language in such a way to favor the 
patent holder by granting full damages, others reasoned that 
it should not be a windfall against the infringing 
manufacturer. Section II.A discusses design infringement, 
Section II.B discusses how courts once conceptualized the 
way in which damages ought to be calculated and finally, 
Section II.C describes the history behind the formation of 
section 289. 
 
A. Who’s Looking, and at What? 
 
In 1871, it was imperative for the Supreme Court to clearly 
define the scope of what a design patent covered.20 In a 
seminal case, Gorham Co. v. White,21 two manufactures 
produced strikingly similar silverware. Both parties had 
argued over how similar a design needed to be to incur an 
actionable, infringing offense.22 The Court reasoned that, 
notwithstanding an expert’s keen eye, an infringement only 
occurs when lay consumers are unable to distinguish one 
brand from the other.23 Specifically, “that if, in the eye of an 
 
19 Stephen Nellis, Apple, Samsung settle U.S. patent dispute, REUTERS, 
(Jun 27, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-samsung-elec/ 
apple-samsung-settle-u-s-patent-dispute-idUSKBN1JN2S4. 
20 Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871). 
21 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 511. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 528 (“Experts, therefore, are not the persons to be deceived. Much 
less than that which would be substantial identity in their eyes would be 
undistinguishable in the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordinary 
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ordinary observer . . . the resemblance is such as to deceive 
such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it 
to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the 
other.”24 Thus, the Court decided that the test should focus 
upon the point of view of the consumer, rather than a 
specialist trained in the relevant field.25 The reasoning 
behind this conclusion was that an expert would always 
discover some sort of discrepancy no matter what, as no two 
items could ever be exactly alike.26 The Court explained that 
“[t]here never could be piracy of a patented design, for human 
ingenuity has never yet produced a design, in all its details, 
exactly like another—so like that an expert could not 
distinguish them.”27  
 Many years later, the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gorham remained the standard for considering when a 
design had been infringed, but the scope of the test became 
more sophisticated with time. In 2008, the Federal Circuit in 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.28 dealt with a design 
infringement case where the creator of a nail buffer sought to 
enforce its design patent against its competitor. In 
considering if there had been an infringement, the Federal 
Circuit took into consideration that products sitting on the 
market do not just appear on the shelves, isolated and 
without any relation to all of the other similar products that 
surround it.29 Rather, that the ordinary observer looking at 
 
acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article upon which the 
design has been placed that degree of observation which men of ordinary 
intelligence give. It is persons of the latter class who are the principal 
purchasers of the articles to which designs have given novel appearances, 
and if they are misled, and induced to purchase what is not the article 
they supposed it to be.”). 
24 Id. 
25 See supra note 22. 
26 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528. 
27 Id.  
28 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
29 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F. 3d at 674. 
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the device amongst the “prior art,” would see what makes 
this particular device special or “novel” from all of the others 
enough to stand out and warrant patent protection.30 
To illustrate the complexity of this standard, the court 
introduced the example of a woman shopping for clothes.31 To 
an unfamiliar observer, a rack of dresses might appear to 
look substantially the same in design, however a familiar 
shopper would be well acquainted with the signature cuts, 
colors and styles relevant and popular in the “prior art” in 
order to know what dresses are stolen images or just creative 
variations. In particular, the Federal Circuit provided the 
following example: 
  
prior to the conception of th[e] design 
there were in use and on sale very 
many similar garments, with 
variations in design so slight as to 
leave to the ordinary observer the 
impression of a very general 
resemblance, and we must assume 
that to womankind, who are the 
purchasers in the main of this class of 
garment, these various coincident 
forms of garments were known, and 
whether such purchasers would be 
deceived into taking the garments 
which are alleged to infringe for a 
garment of the patented design would 
necessarily depend largely upon that 
general knowledge.32  
 
Therefore, rather than leaving the discussion about design 
infringement to what the Gorham Court left us many years 
ago in 1871, patent law incrementally evolved to address who 
 
30 Id.  
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exactly is looking at the product, along with other vital 
considerations that must go into discerning if something has 
really been infringed. 
 
1. Apportionment Theory 
 
Even in modern patent jurisprudence it is clear that in the 
event a legitimate infringement is found, the patent holder 
has the opportunity to collect damages; yet, confusion has 
always persisted concerning exactly how to apply those 
damages.33 While it may be simple to assign an award to 
manufactures who hold a patent covering a singular device, 
products, more often than not, are multifaceted—complete 
with various, functioning parts. Because this process of 
figuring out how to separate the “article” in these particular 
cases has traditionally been so difficult, patent holders 
generally were “able to recover the infringer’s profits on the 
entire device, despite the fact that the design patent was 
limited to a portion of the device.”34 This broad method of 
applying damages often furnished a “windfall” to patent 
holders.35  
Yet, despite the confusion amongst courts, history 
seemed to favor an “apportionment” approach, or rather, 
granting patent holders damages only from the specific 
component of their device that was actually infringed. A 
notable example of this is seen in the Piano cases, Bush & 
Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros I and II.36 In 1913, looking to 
the “ordinary observer” and “prior art” standards, the district 
court for the Southern District of New York found that the 
defendant, a manufacturer of pianos, had infringed the 
 
33 Thomas J. Daly & Katherine Quigley, Patent Infringement as Applied 
in Samsung v. Apple, 40 L.A. LAW. 10 (2017). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 209 F. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), 
rev'd, 222 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1915). 
 
 
Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd. v. Apple Inc. 
28 Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 
 
plaintiff’s designs on the outer body of their pianos.37 Though, 
instead of damages being awarded just for the outer 
decorative casing, the court granted damages over the entire 
instrument.38 On the first appeal, the Second Circuit rejected 
this conclusion and highlighted an important distinction: 
“what [the] [Plaintiff] invented was a piano case, not a piano. 
He received a patent for a ‘piano case’ and not for a piano, but 
he has recovered the profits on 958 pianos.”39 Thus, 
apparently deciding not to overcomplicate the matter, the 
Second Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff received an unjust 
windfall. Particularly, that “[he has] been awarded the 
profits on the piano proper, for which it holds no patent, when 
its recovery should have been confined to the part which 
alone is covered by the claim of its patent.”40 This discussion 
ultimately lead to the conclusion of the dispute on the second 
appeal, where the Second Circuit finally decided that “the 
ends of justice are best served by apportioning, and thus 




37 Bush, 209 F. at 233. 
38 Id. 
39 Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 222 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1915). 
40 Id. at 904. 
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B.  Forming a Rule 
 
As a result of fear over disproportionate applications of 
patent protections for design infringements, finding a clear-
cut way to guard against the uncertainty has remained an 
impetus for the Supreme Court to perfect an ideal test. In 
Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co.,42 a case about carpet designs, 
the Court affirmed the finding of a design infringement, but 
rejected the damage award.43 The Court had found fault with 
the trial court’s calculation method of taking the amount 
plaintiff would have normally profited off a typical sale of the 
product with the included design, rather than just the design 
itself.44 The Court reasoned that there was simply no link 
between how much plaintiff typically received in the sale of 
each, whole carpet, and what the design itself actually 
enriched the defendant.45 Instead, the Court decided that 
patent holders must provide proof that the profits the 
infringer received derived “due to” the design and not any 
other part or attribute.46 In addition, the Court in Dobson v. 
Dornan47reached a similar conclusion, reasoning that 
“plaintiff[s] must show what profits or damages are 
attributable to the use of the infringing design.”48  
In summary, these Dobson cases subsequently became 
the foundation for damage allocation procedures and as a 
result, were largely codified in section 289 of the Patent Act.49 
Importantly, the decisions indicate, that early on, the Court 
had made up its mind that damages should only be linked to 
 
42 Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 5 S. Ct. 945 (1885). 
43 Dobson, 5 S. Ct. at 949. 
44 Id. at 947. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Dobson v. Dornan, 6 S. Ct. 946 (1886).  
48 Id. at 949. 
49 Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 433 (2016). 
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what was actually taken or infringed, and to not default to 




However, despite the Court’s efforts in trying to provide a 
clear standard for damage allotment, the application of the 
interpretation still remained a complex and muddied issue 
nonetheless. The debate that persisted remained very 
technical; primarily hinging on whether the statutory 
language, “article of manufacture” could also incorporate an 
interpretation that meant just an aspect of the larger, 
complete whole of a multicomponent product for sale.  
For example, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,50 the Court 
again reasoned that the statutory language ought to be 
interpreted broadly so to incorporate the intricate parts of a 
machine rather subscribing to a narrower method.51 In 
addition, the United States Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals in Application of Zahn,52 further clarified and 
provided more structure to the interpretation, finding that “a 
design for an article of manufacture may be embodied in less 
than all” of the entire product for sale.53 However, there were 
also many instances where it appeared as though courts 
pushed back against this interpretation, or manipulated how 
this rule ought to be applied.54 In Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc.,55 the Federal Circuit stated that 
“apportionment” where “the patentee was required to show 
what portion of the infringer's profit, or of his own lost profit, 
 
50 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
51 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 435 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 
303, 308 (1980)). 
52 Application of Zahn, 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
53 Id. at 267. 
54 See Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 
1980), Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 476, 495 (D.Minn. 
1980).  
55 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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was due to the design and what portion was due to the article 
itself,” was a relic of the past.56 The court reasoned that the 
apportionment method “presented particularly difficult 
problems of proof for design patentees” and similarly 
portrayed the Dobson cases as the pinnacle of the issue.57 It 
was then in 2015 that the Federal Circuit in Apple Inc. v. 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. leading up to Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., used this shifting 
momentum to similarly find that the apportionment process 
requiring patent holders to finely sparse out which part of 
their multicomponent products damages could derive from, 
was overly complex and chose to render the old interpretation 
obsolete.58 
In addition to the confusion, Supreme Court rulings 
closely reflected such back and forth movement 
representative of the times as well. In 2015, the Court in 
Nordock, Inc. v. Systems Inc.,59 considered the matter settled; 
“reiterat[ing] that apportioning profits in the context of 
design patent infringement is not appropriate.”60 
Particularly in this case, since the infringed design in 
question on a dock leveler was “welded” to the product and 
there was no evidence presented to prove the components 
were ever sold separately.61 Notably, buttressing the Court’s 
decision was the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Apple to 
do away with the ostensibly more complex way of damage 
apportionment.62 Even still, the continuous oscillation in 
what method in allocation was the correct one has yet to come 
to a standstill. The Court in handling the primary case, 
 
56 Nike, 138 F. 3d at 1441.  
57 Id. 
58 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
59 Nordock, Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 803 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
60 Nordock, 803 F. 3d at 1354. 
61 Id. at 1355. 
62 Id.  
 
 
Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd. v. Apple Inc. 
32 Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 
 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., took a radical 
move to again shift back its opinion of how section 289 should 
apply, using the original Dobson cases that originally 
inspired the statute.63 
 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING  
 
In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., the Supreme 
Court reversed the Federal Circuit in its refusal to reduce the 
damages awarded to Apple based on Samsung’s sale of its 
entire smartphone with the infringed design.64 In doing so, 
the Court concluded that the relevant statutory language 
that has long been under dispute, the “article of 
manufacture,” is nothing more than an item that is either 
produced in a factory or handmade by the manufacturer.65 
Therefore, when the issue relates to design infringement that 
happens to be applied to the more complex, multicomponent 
products for sale, section 289 of the Patent Act may also cover 
each distinct aspect.66 The Court’s final decision, however, 
did not provide a test to precisely categorize the relevant 
“article” for purposes of damage allocation.  
  
 
63 Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 432-33 (2016). 
64 Id.at 434. 
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A. Remembering Dobson’s Rule 
 
The Court began its analysis by teasing out the importance 
of patent protections that cover design, distinguishing it from 
other aspects of the product in question such as actual utility 
or functionality of the device.67 Then, quoting the Act, the 
Court explained that “patent protection is available for a 
‘new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture.’”68 And, echoing the past, the Court explained 
that “a design patent is infringed ‘if, in the eye of an ordinary 
observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, 
two designs are substantially the same.’”69 
The Court then highlighted that its prior decisions 
were consistent with the concept of apportionment.70 Citing 
the Dobson cases, the Court showed that, in suits concerning 
design infringements in multicomponent products, it is 
customary to “construe[] the statute to require proof that the 
profits were ‘due to’ the design rather than other aspects of 
the carpets.”71 Furthermore, it clarified that these prior 
decisions provided the guiding framework that was more or 
less the basis for the Patent Act currently under such intense 
debate and confusion.72 Specifically, that it was “in response 
to the Dobson cases [that] Congress enacted a specific 
damages remedy for design patent infringement.”73  
Moreover, section 289 requires that if an infringement 
is found, the infringer must be liable to the patent holder for 
the “extent of his total profit, but not less than $250.”74 Here, 
the Court became very technical with the actual meaning of 
 
67 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433. 
68 Id. at 432. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 432-33. 
71 Id. at 433. 
72 Id. 
73 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433 (emphasis added). 
74 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012). 
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the word “total” and sought assistance from the American 
Heritage Dictionary, stating that “‘total’ of course, means all 
. . . the ‘total profit’ for which [section] 289 makes an infringer 
liable is thus all of the profit made from the prohibited 
conduct, that is, from the manufacture or sale of the ‘article 
of manufacture’ to which [the patented] design or colorable 
imitation has been applied.”75 Thus, beyond laying the 
background information for the codification of the Act, the 
Court also stressed that the language itself was simple. As a 
result of this analysis, the Court reasoned that the proper 
method for damage calculation necessarily involves a two-
step test. Courts must “first, identify the ‘article of 
manufacture’ to which the infringed design has been 
applied,” and “second, calculate the infringer's total profit 
made on that article of manufacture.”76 
Though, “[u]nder the former interpretation” of section 
289, “a patent holder will always be entitled to the infringer's 
total profit from the end product,”77 the Court considered that 
the correct interpretation of the statute was to be much 
different. The Court reasoned that the term “article” really 
means nothing more than “just a particular thing” and that 
“manufacture” means “the conversion of raw materials by the 
hand, or by machinery, into articles suitable for the use of 
man” and “the articles so made.”78 By breaking down the 
statutory language this way, the Court simplified a lot of the 
confusion surrounding section 289. Rather than diving deep 
into how prior courts have wrestled with these terms and how 
to properly apply them, the Court found that “an article of 
manufacture, then, is simply a thing made by hand or 
machine” and therefore, appears to be “broad enough to 
encompass both a product sold to a consumer as well as a 
 
75 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 435. 
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component of that product.”79 This point is at the heart of the 
Court’s logic, and effectively deemed the Federal Circuit’s 




In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that section 289 of the Patent Act is sufficiently 
broad to both encompass a sole component of a product and 
also the complete product prepared for sale.80 The Court 
came to the correct conclusion because it properly construed 
the language of the statute by looking to each precise 
meaning of the words without overcomplicating or 
manipulating them. Further, the Court’s reasoning was 
correct because it was practical; the holding comfortably 
rested upon precedent, showing a positive regression back to 
its initial findings on the issue. However, the decision is not 
without its complications. In the end, Samsung Electronics 
Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., and its eventual settlement, left no 
map or guideline to help future courts determine the precise 
articles of manufacture.  
 
A. The Supreme Court Was Right to Assert that 
Design Infringements Need Not Always 
Include the Finished Product  
 
The Court was correct to interpret the statutory language 
broadly. More specifically, that “the [phrase] ‘article of 
manufacture’ is broad enough to embrace both a product sold 
to a consumer and a component of that product, whether sold 
separately or not.”81 Therefore, the lower court’s ultimate 
refusal to reduce the damage award to reflect only the 
amount made on the infringed design, forced a “narrow a 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 434. 
81 Id.at 436. 
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meaning to the phrase.”82  In addition, the Court’s reasoning 
makes logical sense—if investigated, a general search for the 
word “article” will likely show that the term may mean a part 
of a larger whole.83 Because such definition is in fact so broad, 
the Court was correct in its understanding that it would be 
futile to curtail its meaning to any interpretation that does 
not provide for that. Rather, the Court’s decision 
acknowledged that the term “article” inherently incorporates 
that which may be a distinct piece of a larger whole.84  
In the opinion, the Court strongly emphasized that 
though “a component may be integrated into a larger 
product...[that] [this] does not put it outside the category of 
articles of manufacture.”85 Comparatively, this same logic 
was described in the United States Amicus Brief submitted 
in anticipation of this decision; almost echoing the Court’s 
findings. 
 
The court below appears to have 
assumed that the relevant “article of 
manufacture” is necessarily the final 
product as sold in commerce. That is 
incorrect. When Congress first 
adopted the “total profit” standard, it 
was responding to concerns raised 
about a specific set of products - 
carpets, wallpaper, and the like - that 
are composed of a single component... 
But nothing in section 289’s text or 
history suggests that the relevant 
“article of manufacture” must 
invariably be the product as sold. To 
the contrary, the term “article of 
 
82 Id. 
83 Definition of the word “article,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/article (last visited Jan. 7, 2018). 
84 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434. 
85 Id. at 435. 
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manufacture” literally encompasses 
all manufactured objects—both 
complete products and components—
and it has historically been 
understood to include both.86 
 
The brief, which was submitted neutrally in support of 
neither party, hits upon the reality at hand; it would be 
contrived and artificial to trumpet the idea that section 289’s 
language only means straight-to-sale products.  
 Noticeably, the Court’s reasoning is not only deeply 
rooted in the text, its analysis of the issues at hand are clean; 
it does not seek to overcomplicate the question to be 
clarified—using only a standard dictionary definition to 
make a point. Moreover, as seen from the Amicus Brief, the 
legal background leading up to the case, precedent and 
history, all work together to firmly buttress the opinion. 
  
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision Enhanced, 
Rather than Detracted From Existing Law 
 
As detailed, not only did Congress adopt a particular 
standard to provide adequate remedies for instances of 
design infringement,87 the framework and basis for the 
adoption was rooted in the Dobson cases and its progeny,88 
all requiring the apportionment of damage awards. However, 
the lower courts consistently ran back and forth, struggling 
with how to remedy infringements from patent protections 
covering products that only grew more advanced and 
sophisticated throughout time. 
The more contemporary example of this struggle may 
be seen in Nordock, where the court there found that “an 
 
86 Brief for the United States at 27, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777). 
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improper methodology” was used, showing “an incorrect 
understanding of the relevant article of manufacture.”89 In 
denying the defendant’s plea to apportion the damages to the 
infringed aspect of the product, lip and hinge plates of a dock 
leveler, the court adamantly stated that the plates could not 
be severed from the product. For purposes of section 289, 
“total profit” can only mean “the entire profit on the sale of 
the article to which the patented design is applied . . . .”90 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Samsung puts the 
confusion at rest. The Court’s reasoning accurately expresses 
the view that this method of interpretation is inherently 
divorced to how section 289 of the Patent Act was engineered. 
Specifically, the Court highlighted that Congress acted “in 
response to the Dobson cases,”91 where it reasoned that the 
lower court’s grant of “the entire profit...in the manufacture 
and sale of carpets of the patented designs, and not merely 
the value which the designs contributed to the carpets” was 
in error and inherently misguided.92 In remanding the case, 
the Court found it appropriate instead to limit damages.  The 
Dobson cases, only further buttress the Court’s opinion that 
apportionment is the underlying method behind how section 
289 should actually be applied.93 
 
 
89 Nordock, Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 803 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
90 Id. 
91 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433 (“In 1887, in response to the Dobson cases, 
Congress enacted a specific damages remedy for design patent 
infringement...The new provision made it unlawful to manufacture or sell 
an article of manufacture to which a patented design or a colorable 
imitation thereof had been applied. An act to amend the law relating to 
patents, trademarks, and copyright. . . . It went on to make a design 
patent infringer ‘liable in the amount of $250’ or ‘the total profit made by 
him from the manufacture or sale . . . of the article or articles to which 
the design, or colorable imitation thereof, has been applied.’ The Patent 





VICTORIA E. THORNTON 
Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 39 
 
C.  Future Implications: The Ripple Effect  
 
As mentioned, the Court’s decision to widen the scope of 
section 289 was an enhancement of the pre-existing case law. 
However, though the standard requiring apportionment as 
set forth in the Dobson cases had already become the 
preferred view of Congress, the basis for these ideals have 
derived from the eighteenth century.94 Specifically, from an 
era where technology did not include multicomponent 
electronics devices. Since this time, the Court has wholly left 
the issue undisturbed, and because of the law’s characteristic 
inability to move directly in tandem with technological 
advancement, courts were essentially left rudderless, forced 
to navigate uncertain territories and waters. This sense of 
rudderless direction is still, curiously, in place even after the 
Court’s ruling on the matter.  
The Court’s holding was adept, but only theoretically 
so; it neglected to offer what patent applicants and reviewing 
courts need to parse what the correct “article” in any given 
circumstance is in practice. Without offering any sort of test, 
the Court simply remanded the case and left it up to the 
Federal Circuit to reconfigure Apple’s damage award.95 
Looking to the future, this leaves the world of patent creation 
and the subsequent litigation it inevitably produces, 
uncertain.  
This imbalance between theory and practice in the 
technology field will likely prove detrimental. Because the 
Court effectively volleyed the decision back to the Federal 
Circuit to formulate its own test—offering advice that the 
“article” could be only a component as well as the entire 
device, it is very likely that the amount of the original 
 
94 Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 5 S. Ct. 945 (1885); Dobson v. Dornan, 
6 S. Ct. 946 (1886). 
95 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 436. 
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damage award could have remained undisturbed.96 However, 
since the Samsung case has since settled outside of court for 
an undisclosed value, interested spectators determined to see 
the outcomes of this case will never appreciate the real 
impact. 
In addition to such considerations, it appeared as 
though the deliberating jury actually intended the initial 
Apple award to be punitive, endeavoring to hurt Samsung.97 
Reuters’ interview with the foreman on the case stated 
concerning the verdict that: “[w]e wanted to make sure the 
message we sent was not just a slap on the wrist...[w]e 
wanted to make sure it was sufficiently high to be painful, 
but not unreasonable.”98 Yet, this is clearly in error. Section 
289 seeks only to make the patent holder whole once more; 
the statutory language does not contemplate punitive 
measure. In summary, despite the Court’s meticulous review 
of the American Dictionary and past sources to rightfully 
clarify the scope of the statute,99 the new decision did not 
provide any guidance concerning what procedures are 
actually required. 
Moreover, though the Court’s ruling was correct to 
read the term “article” broadly, allowing damages for design 
infringements to be apportioned to components as well as full 
devices, the brief opinion may feel half-baked for creators and 
patent hopefuls looking for further guidance. Samsung 
released a statement concerning the matter, stating that the 
original award was not necessarily “a win for Apple, but a 
 
96 Id. (“We decline to lay out a test for the first step of the § 289 damages 
inquiry. . . . Doing so is not necessary to resolve the question presented in 
this case, and the Federal Circuit may address any remaining issues on 
remand.”). 
97 Infra note 97. 
98 Dan Levine, Jury Didn't Want to Let Samsung off Easy in Apple Trial: 
Foreman, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/us-apple-
samsung-juror/jury-didnt-want-to-let-samsung-off-easy-in-apple-trial-
foreman-idINBRE87O09U20120825. 
99  See supra note 74. 
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loss for the American consumer,” meaning that the award 
“will lead to fewer choices, less innovation, and potentially 
higher prices.”100 Moreover, the opinion may have left open a 
gap for the risk of stagnation in creative innovation to 
flourish. Written in a separate statement, Samsung stated: 
 
[I]nnovation will be stymied by fear of 
litigation and the loss of all profits 
should a product be found to infringe 
any design patent—no matter how 
insignificant. For example, with their 
design patent for a front screen with 
rounded corners, Apple received all of 
Samsung’s profits from the sale of its 
phones. Such a ruling discourages 
innovators from bringing new 
products to market.101  
 
While of course, these statements should be read with 
caution of bias, the Court’s brevity and silence concerning 
these important matters has inevitably left uncertainty for 
subsequent patent law litigation. The rule that governs 
concerning infringement cases is if the two designs are so 
similar that they may be mistaken for the alleged infringed 
device.102 Yet with smartphone devices mostly being released 
in square shapes with square touch screen icons, the 
boundaries of what ought to be viciously protected by the law 
and what will inevitably stifle progress and future innovation 
becomes blurred. This is a strange reality.  
 
100 Christina Bonnington, What the Apple v. Samsung Verdict Means for 
the Rest of Us, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/08/ 
what-apple-v-samsung-means/. 
101 SAMSUNG NEWSROOM, Advancing a Better Future for Innovators and 
Consumers, https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-advancing-a-better-
future-for-innovators-and-consumers-scotus-apple-design-patent-law/ 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2018). 
102 Supra note 22. 
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Perhaps because of the Court’s rather bare-bones 
holding, the same sense of rudderless direction has once 
again befallen lower courts who now must go forth and make 
decisions on how to property apply this apportionment 
standard. Now that we know an article may also be a 
component of a device, what then? Furthermore, even with 
this necessary flexibility covering the law of design 
infringement awards created as a result of the Court’s ruling, 
does this change the dangers of potential juries feeling the 
need to punish infringements so that the blows felt by 
subsequent damage awards are “painful”?103 
 
1. Searching for a Test 
 
Though the Court was correct to support the more expansive 
definition of “article,” the Court declined to provide a new test 
or guideline to help figure out how to categorize the relevant 
elements in a multicomponent device. Despite this shortfall, 
the Court did explicitly cite to the Amicus Brief that was 
submitted by the United States.104 In this Brief, the United 
States proposed a model test that posits a case-by-case 
analysis, preferring to focus on the attribute that seems most 
likely to make the wronged patent holder whole once more.105 
The Court was correct to effectively use this Brief in lieu of 
creating an actual test because it supports the apportionment 
standard view the Court trumpets, and also puts in place 
something more concreate and practical for creators and 
courts to use.  
 First, the Court’s decision that damage awards should 
be apportioned to the relevant article, not necessarily the 
whole device,106 is mirrored in the proposed methods in the 
Amicus Brief. The Brief provides: 
 
103 Supra note 97. 
104 Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016). 
105 See supra note 85. 
106 See supra note 15. 
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Congress did not render the infringer 
liable for its total profit on the final 
sold product, however, but only for its 
total profit on the “article of 
manufacture” to which the patented 
design was wrongfully applied. In 
cases where the identity of the 
relevant “article of manufacture” is 
otherwise open to reasonable dispute, 
the factfinder may legitimately 
consider which characterization 
would appropriately compensate 
(rather than over-compensate) the 
patentee for the contribution of the 
patented design to the value of the 
infringer's finished product.107 
 
Secondly, the Court was correct to simply cite the Brief 
because it had already done the lion’s share of the work in 
laying out a practical factor test. Using prior Federal Circuit 
precedent as support for its position, the Brief posits that 
there are several factors that must be looked at. First, the 
patent specification itself must suggest exactly which parts 
the design are associated with the device, and how that 
evidence is then related to the device “as a whole.”108 Second, 
the factfinder must weigh the “prominence” or importance of 
the design to the device; if the design is “conceptually 
distinct” from the complete device and lastly, the factfinder 
must consider the “physical relationship between the 
patented design and the rest of the product,” meaning, if the 
component in question may be physically removed and sold 
separately from the rest of the product.109 
 
107 Brief for the United States at 27, Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777). 
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 The Court, in citing this Brief thus effectively provided 
a way for later courts to properly define the appropriate 
standard concerning how to apportion damages for design 
infringement cases. In the long run, because the actual 
opinion leaves so many questions unanswered, creators 
seeking to secure a patent over a multicomponent product 
would likely be best served by seeking design patents over 
not just the entire device for sale, but also provide coverage 
over its distinct parts to ensure their inventions will be 
adequately protected and to avoid any potential unreliability 
in the application of the apportionment measure.110 
 
CONCLUSION 
In hindsight, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc. did 
what was necessary in undoing what had gone wrong. Rather 
than provide a loophole for patent holders to receive a 
windfall in case of an infringement, section 289 should be 
understood more broadly to curtail this adverse result. This 
should be done under the language of the statute, while at 
the same time still endeavor to honor and adequately protect 
patent holders’ creations. Further, what is clear from the 
Court’s decision and the history that has led up to it is that 
damage allocation must also be executed in a particular way 
in order to guard creative expansion in the technology sector 
and to provide a free space for manufactures to engineer a 
new and innovative product for consumer sale. Keeping these 
factors in mind, the Court’s decision in the matter pushes the 
conversation on the right track. 
 
110 Thomas J. Daly & Katherine Quigley, Patent Infringement as Applied 
in Samsung v. Apple, 40 L.A. LAW. 10, 12 (2017). 
